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Will economic integration lead to skilled citizens being drawn to the larger, richer 
economic partner?  In 1983, Australia and New Zealand signed the Closer Economic 
Relations Agreement to ensure free trade in goods and services.  Was this a modern 
equivalent of Horace Greeley's famous advice "Go West, young man, go West"?  The 
evidence presented in this paper suggests that Greeley was right; many have indeed 
gone westward.  However, a common labour market has not led to a brain drain.   
Paradoxically, the effect has been to increase the numbers of lower-skilled migrants 
from New Zealand and those with higher skills who are older or are not within the 
approved occupational groupings.  The Trans-Tasman picture is further complicated by 
migration to New Zealand from third countries sufficient to offset the outflow of New 
Zealand citizens.  The imbalance in net migration from New Zealand toward Australia 
has led to policy tensions.  These are discussed briefly. 
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The focus of this conference is on economic integration.  A concern expressed by 
some countries considering closer economic links is that it will result in their talented 
people leaving.  The issue posed for this paper was that economic integration has led 
to a brain drain from New Zealand to Australia, and thus would be useful to consider as 
a case study in this context.  As the paper reveals, the story is more complex than 
appears from just the bilateral flows. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  We first provide an empirical background for 
discussion, by placing bilateral migration between Australia and New Zealand within an 
international and historical context.  We then examine a few unilateral concerns with 
these migration flows, before examining two particular policy tensions that have arisen 
between the two governments.  Following that, we shall provide an example of how 
integration can help domestic policies.  The paper closes by looking to the future. 
 
 
What is the evidence of a brain drain
i? 
Before discussing the bilateral flows across the Tasman Sea, we shall look at total New 
Zealand migration with all countries (i.e. a global view).  To put the numbers into 
context, in 1999, the resident population of New Zealand was 3.8 million and that of 
Australia was 19 million
ii.  For both the global and bilateral views, we shall examine first 
the brain drain story based on the total numbers of people migrating, and subsequently 
some quality aspect of migrant flows. 
 
 
Global view: New Zealand and the Rest of the World 
Number of migrants 
 
Figure 1 sets out the permanent and long-term (PLT) migration flows to and from New 
Zealand over the past 40 years.  While the data are derived from the intentions stated 
on arrival and departure cards submitted at the border, the flows shown below have 
been adjusted for subsequent changes in intentions
iii.  The solid line shows arrivals into 
New Zealand who did stay more than a year, while the dotted line shows departures of 
those in New Zealand who did stay away for more than a year.  The shaded area 
shows the net result. 
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Figure 1: Total arrivals, departures and net migration 1961-2000 
(years to September, adjusted data) 
 
The key points are: 
 
•  There is a net outflow just now – In the year to September 2000, total departures 
exceeded arrivals by 18,038. 
•  The current net outflow is relatively small and comes after a long period of net 
inflows – In the current year, New Zealand has lost more people than it has gained.  
But this needs to be seen in context of a net gain of people in the rest of the last 
decade, averaging 7,810 per annum for the decade. 
•  The long-term trend is for a reasonably-sized inflow – Over the last 40 years total 
migration has added 115,389 people to New Zealand’s population.  Broadly 
speaking the 1960s and early 70s were periods of net inflow.  There were large net 
outflows in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s (particularly at the end of each 
decade).  The greatest outflows were in 1978 (30,420) and 1979 (31,907), while the 
largest inflows were in 1974 (29,679) and in 1996 (28,697). 
•  Arrivals and departures are both growing over time – Both departures and arrivals 
have been gradually increasing over time in absolute size and relative to the New 
Zealand population.  In the last three decades, annual gross flows have generally 
been more than 1 percent of the population.  However, net flows are a small 
proportion of total gross flows. 
•  Net inflows and outflows have been volatile – Before the late 1960s inflows and 
outflows were small and stable compared with those since then.  Large fluctuations 
in net inflows and outflows have been a feature of migration flows since the late 
1960s (Bedford and Lidgard, 1999)
iv.  Interpreting immigration trends based on a 
single year’s data is a hazardous game at best. 
 
To obtain a fuller understanding of the composition of these flows, Figure 2 breaks 

















Figure 2: Total net migration by citizenship  
1953-2000 (years to March) 
 
The main points are: 
 
•  There is a long term trend for net outflows of New Zealanders – Over the last 47 
years, New Zealand has lost almost 484,000 New Zealand citizens, an average 
of just over 10,000 every year. 
•  Growing departures by New Zealand citizens have been driving the net losses 
recently – Permanent and long term departures of New Zealand citizens have 
been growing since 1993.  They peaked at almost 60,000 a year in 1979 and 
again in 1989.  They are now close to this level again.  At the same time, 
permanent and long term arrivals of New Zealand citizens have been relatively 
static for the last 20 years. 
•  New Zealand citizens are being replaced with citizens of other countries – The 
483,883 New Zealand citizens who have departed over the past 47 years have 
been replaced with 81,159 Australian citizens, and 676,257 citizens of other 
countries, for a net gain of 273,533. 
 
While New Zealand has gained migrants, on average over the past 40 years, the net 
effect on human capital will depend on whether there are differences between the 
people leaving, and the people coming in.  To the extent that such differences exist, 
migration may have a stronger influence on the characteristics of the population than it 
does on the total numbers.  The usual key characteristics of interest in the brain drain 
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Skill composition 
 
What were the skills of those coming into New Zealand compared to those who left?  
Unfortunately, there is only relatively unreliable information on the skills of migrants
v.  
In addition, comparable data is available only since 1992.  Nevertheless, it is still 
potentially useful to examine whether these data support the brain drain hypothesis.  
Glass (2001) has classified permanent and long term migrants into three broad skill 
levels (high-skill, semi-skill, and low-skill)
vi.  The following figure looks at the net effect 
of PLT migration. 
 
Figure 3: Net permanent and long term migration by imputed skill level 
1992-2000 (years to September) 
Year  High skill  Semi skill Low skill 
NAE* 
or not  
specified  Total 
1992 -446  -285  1,537  1,968  2,774 
1993 2,710 185  222  8,460  11,577 
1994 4,613  -29  356  13,538  18,478 
1995 6,357  116  1,049  18,796  26,318 
1996 6,891  275  1,556  18,546  27,268 
1997 2,666  -666  -280  11,179  12,899 
1998 -1,103  -1,946  -2,591  1,777  -3,863 
1999  -3,079 -1,834 -3,488 -2,144  -10,545 
2000 -4,197  -2,583  -3,108  360  -9,528 
Total 14,412 -6,767 -4,747  72,480  75,378 
Note: *NAE = Not Actively Engaged 
 
The key points from this figure are: 
 
•  There is a small outflow across all skill levels recently – Since 1998, more 
people have been leaving across all skill levels than have been coming. 
•  This small outflow is dwarfed by the size of the inflow earlier this decade –
Across the whole decade, there has been a net inflow of those in high-skill 
occupations, and net outflows of those in semi- and low-skilled occupations. 
•  The skill levels of most migrants cannot be determined – About half of all 
migrants report unspecified occupations or that they are not actively engaged.  
Exactly how this response should be interpreted is unclear.  Furthermore, since 
the cards are not checked on entry, the data is not very reliable. 
 
While Figure 3 above reveals some useful points about the net effect, we need to test 
whether there has been a change in migration patterns across the skill distribution for 
those leaving and coming (i.e. the gross effect).  Figure 4 shows the percentage of 
permanent and long-term (PLT) arrivals and departures in each skill category.  It is 
noted that these are of proportions of all those who do specify an occupation that could 
be coded
vii.  In particular, we compare the three-year average percentages at the 
beginning and end of the 1992-2000 period. 
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Figure 4: Percentage of PLT arrivals and departures in each skill category 
3-year averages at start and end of the 1992-2000 period (years to March) 
Note: The figures above are of proportions of all those who do specify an occupation that could be coded. 
 
Analysis of recorded occupations seems to suggest the following key points: 
 
•  The skill distribution of those departing has not changed substantially over time 
•  Arrivals are getting more skilled over time – The proportion of arrivals accounted 
for by the high-skilled has grown substantially over time.  At the same time, the 
proportion of low-skilled people arriving has fallen. 
•  Arrivals are slightly more skilled than departures 
 
Another characteristic of migrants that is often analysed when examining the brain 




The key points that Glass (2001) noted include the following: 
 
•  Younger people are leaving, while older ones are coming – More 15-24 year olds 
have left for more than 12 months than have come almost every year for the last 
two decades.  In contrast, the greatest inflows are generally the 25-39 year olds. 
•  Permanent and long-term immigrants seem to be becoming older 
•  The age of those departing also seems to have increased 
 
The overall story is that there is a net gain to NZ from migration over the past 40 years, 
with departing younger NZ citizens being more than replaced by adult non-NZ citizens.  
These flows, however, are quite volatile.  Next, we shall examine the source and 








































Source and destination countries 
 
The following figure sets out the net migration position for different source and 
destination countries. 
 
Figure 5: Net permanent and long-term migration for different source and 
destination locations 1979-2000 (years to September)
viii 
Key points to be noted from Figure 5: 
 
•  Large numbers of New Zealand residents go to Australia – In almost every year, 
New Zealand has lost more people to Australia than it got back, although the 
extent of the flow varied substantially over time.  High levels of net outflows have 
occurred in the latter part of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  It is worth noting that 
the number of departures to Australia followed a far more erratic trend than that 
of departures to other countries. 
•  Arrivals are diversifying – New Zealand consistently gained people from Asia, 
and in the 1990s, this trend expanded considerably so that Asia is the biggest 
source region for permanent and long-term migrants.  The picture with respect to 
the United Kingdom is more mixed with periods of net inflow and net outflow over 
the last 20 years (Bedford and Lidgard, 1997 and Lidgard and Bedford, 1999). 
 
More disaggregated data shows that about half of all people leaving over the last 20 
years have gone to Australia, with the United Kingdom accounting for another 20%. 
 
As a result of these migration patterns, NZ-born in Australia now amount to about 10% 
of the current NZ population.  (A further 1.5% live in the UK, 0.5% in Canada and the 
US, and 1.5% in other parts of the world.)
ix  In summary, NZ-born people who are 
currently overseas are approximately 15 percent of the current NZ population, and a 
majority of them (about two-thirds) are in Australia. 
 
In comparison, according to the 1996 census data, 17% of those living in New Zealand 
were born overseas.  Most of these were from the United Kingdom and Ireland, and 














both an origin and a destination country.  This leads us to the next subsection on trans-
Tasman flows. 
 
Bilateral view: New Zealand and Australia 





There has been free flow of people since the earliest settlement.  Freedom of 
movement of people was the norm internationally in the nineteenth century and only 
broke down following the First World War.  New Zealand and Australia, however, 
maintained free mobility.  NZ citizens could enter Australia freely to visit, live and work 
and vice versa. 
 
In 1973, this was recognised in the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which codified 
the understanding. 
 
More generally, the two countries shared many experiences in the nineteenth century, 
having common sources of migrants and a parallel pattern of economic development 
even to the point of their own gold rushes. 
 
As Arnold (1986) puts it,  
“There are few aspects of New Zealand history which make full sense without 
taking some account of Australasian dimensions.” 
 
Over the last century there were a number of long-standing business links between the 
two countries.  Particular examples were banking and farm servicing.  Nevertheless 
there were many impediments to trade in goods and services. 
 
In 1983, the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(CER) was signed with the goal of free trade in goods and services.  Trade and 
business relations between the two countries have deepened since then. 
 
In light of the long history of open labour markets between the two countries and the 
increasing economic integration, it should not be surprising that many of the departing 
NZ citizens go to Australia.  In fact, over the past 20 years, about half of those 
departing have gone there.  It should be borne in mind, however, that over the same 






Numbers of migrants to Australia 
 
Figure 6 shows the permanent and long-term migration between New Zealand and 
Australia since 1947.  The solid line shows arrivals into NZ from Australia intending to 
stay for at least one year.  The dotted line shows departures of New Zealand residents 




Figure 6: Permanent and long term migration with Australia 
1947-2000 (years to March)
xi 
 
The key points from Figure 6 include: 
 
•  Both inflows and outflows to Australia began increasing markedly from the 1960s 
•  Since the late 1960s, the net flow has been almost always from New Zealand to 
Australia – Before that, it was in the opposite direction. 
•  Large and volatile departures from New Zealand to Australia – There have been 
persistent and increasing flows from NZ to Australia since the late 1970s which 
has been very volatile, peaking in the late 70s, 80s and 90s.  It is the variability in 
the flow from New Zealand to Australia that drives the pattern of net migration 
commented on earlier in this paper. 
•  Relatively steady arrivals from Australia t o New Zealand  – In contrast, the 
numbers moving from Australia to New Zealand have been less volatile, but still 
significant.  Some of these will have been New Zealand citizens returning more 
than one year after departing
xii but others will be Australian citizens. 
 

















The evidence suggests that emigration to Australia occurs across all skill categories 
roughly in the same proportion as the population as a whole (see Glass, 2001).  In 
contrast, those departing to other countries tend to be higher skilled.  The difference in 
the skill mix is likely to be due, in large part, to the free entry into Australia under the 
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which allows movement regardless of formal skills. 
 
Furthermore, Humphris (2001) points out that when net outflows are high, the low-
skilled make up a disproportionately large portion of the departures.  We are currently 
experiencing high net outflows, and so, the trend of large net outflows in the low-skilled 
category may be showing up in the data. 
 
 
Consequences of migration 
 
Next, one might ask what the consequences of trans-Tasman migration, and the total 
migration flows to and from New Zealand, are for the country.  There are both unilateral 
and bilateral concerns relating to these flows.  We shall briefly look at a few unilateral 
concerns for New Zealand, before proceeding to the bilateral tensions between 
Australia and New Zealand.  Furthermore, some possible positive effects are 





The discussion in this subsection focuses on the economic effects of migration.  The 
first unilateral concern discussed here is the alleged brain drain due to a net loss of 
workers across the Tasman. 
 
 
Is there a brain drain to Australia? 
 
Let’s sum up the evidence of a brain drain related to economic integration.  We suggest 
that the proposition is not supported on two grounds: 
•  the flow of New Zealanders to Australia is representative of the population 
of New Zealand and is not biased toward the high-skilled; 
•  the flow began in the late 1960s which predates the deepening of economic 
links that occurred in the 1980s. 
 
The first point has been previously noted by others as well (for example St Hill, 1987; 
Bedford, 1987; and Brosnan and Poot, 1987b).  The following quote sums it up nicely. 
“… with respect to the brain drain, the population exchange appears to cover the 
broad spectrum of occupations… and the problem for New Zealand would thus 
appear to be a loss of human resources in general rather than a selective bias of 
the most highly trained persons.” (Brosnan and Poot (1987b, p. 9)) 
 
Instead, what we have is the consequence of a common labour market.  People of all 
skill levels have migrated because of employment and income prospects in Australia.  
This is not a brain drain, which implies the departure of only the most talented.  In fact, 
the main effect of the common labour market has been quite different.  It has allowed 11 
the migration of a broad mix of New Zealanders who might otherwise have been 
screened out of Australia.  The current Australian immigration criteria would exclude 
many of the lower-skilled workers, and also those more skilled workers who are older 
or who do not fit within the approved occupational list. 
 
Nevertheless, there have been a few studies that have claimed that there is a brain 
drain (see for example, Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1986)).  Poot (1993) suggests 
two possible reasons for the difference in results.  One reason is the sensitivity to the 
level of disaggregation when recoding occupational categories into skill groups.  When 
we look at specific occupations, migration appears to be more selective than the 
aggregate data suggest.  Another reason for the difference is that some such analyses 
are done over a short period of time when shortages in specific labour market can play 
an important role.  For example, during the 1980s, many nurses migrated from New 
Zealand to Australia in response to high pay, extensive vacancies and active 
recruitment, until economic conditions changed markedly in New Zealand.  Carpenters 
and builders are another group with high mobility rates (Poot, 1993). 
 
The second concern is that immigrants to New Zealand may not be good substitutes 
for the departing NZ citizens.  This is discussed below. 
 
 
Are immigrants to New Zealand good substitutes for NZ citizen emigrants? 
 
As discussed earlier, we have some evidence that immigrants are likely to be more 
skilled.  The critical question is whether all these skills are being productively used. 
 
The unemployment rates of recent migrants are typically high.  Winklemann (2000) 
gives an overall rate of 35% for migrants in the first year of residence in New Zealand 
based on 1996 Census data.  Rates were substantially lower for younger age groups, 
and those from English speaking countries, and up to 59% for migrants from South 
Asia.  Similar results are cited in Bedford et al. (2000) in relation to specific ethnic 
groups. 
 
However, it is not surprising that unemployment rates for new labour market entrants 
are often very high.  The key question is what happens over time.  Poot et al. (1988) 
present evidence that the likelihood of immigrants being unemployed decreases as 
time in New Zealand increases.  The income of the overseas-born who had been in 
New Zealand 10-14 years in 1981 could be “favourably compared” with the income of 
the New Zealand-born.  Pacific peoples were particularly disadvantaged on arrival, but 
tentative evidence suggested that they experienced rapid declines in unemployment 
and increases in income over time.  The explanation for the differences between 
overseas- and NZ-born focused on skills, and particularly on English language ability. 
 
Results from Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998a) take this point significantly further.  
Their findings indicate that immigrants have a hard time integrating into the labour 
market over time – particularly those from Asia or the Pacific who do not speak English.  
A typical immigrant, despite being relatively highly educated, was likely to have a lower 
income and lower probability of participation and employment than a New Zealand-
born person of the same age and education level in the first years after arrival.  This 
entry disadvantage diminished with years of residence in New Zealand.  There is 
considerable diversity noted for different individuals within these results, and some 
suggestion that the premium for speaking English well has risen over the past decade. 
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These results suggest that while net migration has added numbers to the New Zealand 
population (over the longer term), the incoming migrants may, in fact, not be a 
complete replacement for citizens who departed (at least in the short run), despite 
being apparently higher skilled on average. 
 
BERL (1999) conducted a wide-ranging study on the influences of immigration flows on 
human capital.  They try to get behind the numbers to some estimates of the value of 
immigration flows.  Using occupation-specific wage rates, BERL value the impact of the 
flows of immigrant skills over the 1992-1998 period on the total stock of New Zealand’s 
human capital.  In the year of peak net inward flows (1996) the impact reached 1%.  
But influences vary significantly across occupational groups – with an impact of 3.5% 
on the “Professionals” group in 1996.  Gross flow impacts of immigration were, 
unsurprisingly, somewhat larger.  The seven-year average gave an impact from inward 
migration of around 2.5%, with outward migration at about 2%. In both cases the 
impact was largest on the highest skill occupational categories.  Inward migrants tend 
to be replacing losses rather than augmenting the existing stock of human capital.   
BERL also notes that while the impacts of immigration flows vary quite substantially 
from year to year
xiii. 
 
A third concern in New Zealand is that there could be more generalised losses via the 
departure of NZ citizens, as addressed below. 
 
 
Education and other fiscal concerns 
 
Most education services are substantially funded by taxpayers, who therefore have an 
interest in getting a return on that investment in the form of taxes from the educated 
person over his/her life.  To the extent that educated people take their accumulated 
education overseas with them, the implicit contract with taxpayers is thwarted.  New 
Zealand taxpayers end up, in effect, subsidising the growth of other countries.   And it 
is not necessarily solely a fiscal effect if there are positive externalities from having 
high-skilled people around (some kind of knowledge spillovers). 
 
Other fiscal costs also may be relevant.  New Zealanders qualify for subsidised health 
care by birth or by securing permanent residence.  They can qualify for superannuation 
by working here for some years.  There is a risk that New Zealanders will go overseas 
and avoid the tax that could be expected to fund these costs, and return to New 
Zealand for health care or for superannuation at the cost of the New Zealand taxpayer. 
 
 
Other unilateral concerns 
 
There are also positive effects from migration.  Migration to and from Australia has 
provided an adjustment mechanism to shocks in the labour market (Poot, 1995).   
Trans-Tasman migration is sensitive to demography, the cost of travel and to relative 
economic conditions (earnings and employment opportunities)
xiv.  Similar factors 
influence flows between states within Australia, although there is still a border effect 
affecting NZ movements (Poot, 1995).  International labour mobility appears to be a 
more important channel for adjustment of the NZ labour market to an economic shock 
than is the case for Australia (Aynsley, 2001).  Similarly, Easton (1980) has made a 
conjecture that the net outflow across the Tasman has contributed to New Zealand’s 
relatively low unemployment rate. 
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Emigration and immigration affects New Zealand in many other ways.  For example, 
migrants bring diversity of culture and networks to their host country.  The act of 
migrating suggests they may have more initiative, and be more willing to take risks than 
counterparts who stay put in their native country. 
 
We noted before the numbers of NZ-born who are now living overseas.  What effect 
this diaspora has on NZ can only be speculated.  Are there remaining links that are 
translated into business opportunities?  What financial flows occur – for some countries 
these are known to be important, but in the case of NZ no information is available.  
Various commentators have looked to find some way of harnessing the potential of 
New Zealanders overseas, nothing has been identified so far. 
 
No work is available which assesses all the impacts on NZ of these migration flows.  
With our current information, the result appears ambiguous. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some clear policy challenges to deal with the effects identified 
above.  These include: 
•  increasing economic performance in NZ to make it a more attractive location for 
NZ citizens; 
•  reducing adjustment frictions for immigrants (for example, by recognising 
appropriate qualifications); and 
•  defining and enforcing entitlements to social services and any associated 
obligations (such as the repayment of student loans). 
 
In addition to this set of unilateral concerns, there have been several labour market 
tensions and opportunities that have arisen in the bilateral relationship with Australia.  
Three different sorts of bilateral issues that have arisen in relation to our common 
labour market are discussed below. 
 
 
Bilateral tensions and opportunities  
 
Over the past 30 years, the net flow has been almost always toward Australia from 
New Zealand.  In this regard, the imbalance has probably been similar to that occurring 
from States such as South Australia or Tasmania to Western Australia and 
Queensland. 
 
Successive Australian governments have reiterated their support for the Trans-Tasman 
Travel Arrangement.  However, the large continuing imbalance has led to concerns 
about two areas where the relation between the Commonwealth and New Zealand 
differs from the Commonwealth’s relation with the States. 
 
These two areas are: 
•  the different criteria for third country migrants 
•  the fiscal costs of social security payments. 
 
When the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement was signed in 1973, there were no 
special conditions set to deal with either issue.  At the time, there had been 
approximate balance in migration.  If that balance had continued, then it is likely that 14 
neither issue would have arisen as a point of tension.  In other words, integration plus 
imbalance equals tensions. 
 
We shall discuss these two tensions, and then cover how integration can sometimes 
provide opportunities for improved domestic policy processes.  For this, we discuss the 
treatment of standard setting. 
 
Third country migration 
 
We begin with migrants from third countries.  Both Australia and New Zealand operate 
a point system to select skilled economic migrants.  These are similar but not identical.  
The relative valuation of a potential migrant’s characteristics is not the same.  The 
Australian system gives preference to younger migrants with specific occupational 
skills, whereas the New Zealand system relies more on a “general skills” principle. 
 
A second difference between the two country’s immigration systems relates to migrants 
from Pacific countries.  People from the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau are all NZ 
citizens by birth (the total population of these islands are approximately 22,200).  New 
Zealand also allows an additional annual quota of 1100 (including dependents) from 
Samoa. 
 
Concern has been expressed in Australia that some who would not have qualified 
under Australian criteria have been seeking entry through the “backdoor” by migrating 
first to New Zealand.  They have stated that in the 8 months from July 1999 to 
February 2000, almost one-third of New Zealand migrants to Australia were not born in 
New Zealand. 
 
Taking a slightly longer period from 1994 to 1999, the share of New Zealand migrants 
to Australia not born in New Zealand rose from about 15% in the 1980s to 24%, slightly 
above the share of non-NZ born in the New Zealand population. 
 
It is unclear whether this concern about “backdoor” migration results from a view that: 
•  it causes Australia to lose control of the numbers of immigrants; or 
•  New Zealand standards for third country migrants is lower than those of 
Australia; or  
•  Australia would like to move away from the concept of a common labour 
market and “cherry-pick” migrants from New Zealand. 
 
On the first point, net migration is what matters and Australia can’t prevent its citizens 
leaving.  Furthermore the flows involved are too small.  At most, backdoor migration 
has amounted to around 10% of permanent migration. 
 
On the second point, evidence has not been presented to justify a concern that New 
Zealand standards are lower.  In the 1996 Australian census, those born in New 
Zealand earned a higher average income than other migrants or Australian-born.  The 
data do not show incomes by citizenship at time of migration to Australia, thus we 
cannot test this possibility
xv. 
 
However, the Australian Minister for Immigration, Mr Ruddock recently stated that he 
would like to see a common approach by Australia and New Zealand toward migrants: 
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“I’m anxious to have... common border arrangements... so that if someone is 
eligible to come to Australia they’re going to meet the same criteria if they go to 
New Zealand” (Philip Ruddock, September 2000) 
 
In regard to the third point, should the average income of NZ migrants be even higher 
than that of other groups in Australia such as the native-born?  After all, as economists, 
we all appreciate that what matters is the marginal migrant not the average one.   
Wouldn’t “cherry-picking” out the skilled migrants be a better policy for Australia?  It is 
not the declared intention of the Australian government in respect to the Trans-Tasman 
Travel Arrangement.  In fact, Australian ministers have declared continual support for 
the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, as the following recent quote illustrates: 
 
“Under the changes, Australian and New Zealand citizens will continue to be able 
to visit, work, study and live in each other's country indefinitely as has been the 
case for many years” (Philip Ruddock, 26 February 2001). 
 
The inability to select migrants from New Zealand has been a concern in relation to the 
fiscal cost of social security payments to migrants.  Australian officials have argued that 
the fiscal cost is more than would have been the case if Australia had been able to 
select its New Zealand migrants.  These fiscal costs include transfer payments made to 
those who are invalids and unable to work, single parents and those aged over 65.  
This fiscal cost issue is the second area of tension that has resulted from the large 
imbalance in migration flows, which is discussed next. 
 
Income transfer payments 
 
From 1969, there was a “host country” agreement under which Australians received 
immediate access to all New Zealand benefits and vice versa. 
 
After the balance of migration tilted strongly towards Australia in the late 1970s, 
Australian governments sought changes to the arrangements.   An agreement to 
reimburse costs was reached in 1988, and modified in 1994.  Under this agreement, 
lump sum payments are made between the Governments to contribute towards the 
cost of some benefits paid to each other’s nationals
xvi. 
 
This arrangement has just been changed.  Both governments were concerned over the 
administrative complexity of the reimbursing scheme. 
 
The Australian authorities were mainly concerned with the gross fiscal cost of making 
the payments net of the NZ reimbursement.  A secondary argument was that if the 
Australians could be more selective in choosing migrants from New Zealand then fewer 
payments would need to be made. 
 
The NZ response was to point to: 
•  the above average income, skill levels employment and participation rates of 
New Zealanders in Australia; 
•  the contribution that New Zealanders make to the Australian tax base; 
•  the investment that New Zealand taxpayers make in the education and 
training of people before they migrate; and 
•  the fact that when New Zealand immigrants who worked in Australia retire in 




The Agreement reached recently by the two governments on the 26
th of February 2001 
has changed the basis for benefit payments
xviii.  The new arrangements cover the 
pension entitlements for those who are retired and payments to those who are 
seriously disabled. 
 
Individual beneficiaries will receive dual payments, one from each Government 
according to the proportion of the individual’s working life spent in each country.   
Decisions on the entitlement to all other transfer payments (such as for single parents) 
are outside the agreement and are a matter for the Government concerned. 
 
Social security schemes of the sort (up to recent times) in Australia and New Zealand 
do not cope well with high international mobility and large imbalances of flows 
compared with contributory schemes with accounts held in the names of individuals.  
With large imbalances, social security schemes risk making payments to people 
without having the full benefit of their tax contributions in the past.  If there are 
substantial differences in social security policies, then people may choose to locate to 
maximize the benefits they receive. 
 
A couple of solutions to this problem are to match policies or to move closer to an 
individualized insurance approach.  Another, such as with the new Australia–New 
Zealand Social Security Agreement, is for each government to make its own payments 
based on the percentage of working life in a country directly to the recipient.  This 
approach is amenable to being extended to any number of participating countries.  It is 
likely to become more important in the future to accommodate rising international 
mobility when imbalances become increasingly likely. 
 
We have just discussed two examples of tensions that arise in a common labour 
market with large imbalances.  The next section looks at another sort of issue that 
arises in all joint markets.  With integration, a decision has to be made on how to 




Three broad options for setting standards are listed below, which we label as political, 
bureaucratic and market, although there can be lots of variants that mix and match: 
•  political: reaching a political deal on common standards between the two 
countries then using separate domestic regulations and relying on domestic 
courts to enforce.  Over time the standards can drift apart as a result of slightly 
different approaches by the two judiciaries, forcing a further political process to 
realign 
•  bureaucratic: forming a supra-national body – which transfers the routine 
exercise of sovereignty to an independent body.  This has been done for food 
standards; 
•  market: allowing the decisions of firms to select which set of standards and 
associated processes will apply.  Allowing for mutual recognition of standards 
set in either jurisdiction has done this. 
 
The Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA), which came into effect 
on 1 May 1998, provides that goods that can be legally sold in one country can be sold 
in the other, and that people who are registered to carry out an occupation in one 17 
country are entitled to practise an equivalent occupation in the other.  This mirrors the 
arrangements that existed between Australian States. 
 
While the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement confirmed the free flow of citizens 
between Australia and New Zealand, it did not deal with other regulatory impediments 
to the flow of skilled migrants between the two countries.  In particular, differences in 
registration requirements for similar occupations often meant that individuals would 
need to meet registration requirements in the other country, despite the fact that the 
occupations were similar in both countries. For example, a nurse in New Zealand 
would be required to sit further examinations before being allowed to practice nursing 
in any state in Australia. In many cases, these differences in regulatory requirements 
simply reflect national historical or institutional arrangements, rather than the objective 
assessment of risks to public health, safety and the environment. 
 
The TTMRA is a simple, low cost and low maintenance way of overcoming 
unnecessary regulatory impediments to flow of skilled workers between Australia and 
New Zealand. It avoids the need for harmonisation of all regulatory requirements, 
recognising that there may be legitimate reasons for differences between the countries, 
but at the same time encourages convergence of regulatory systems over time.  
 
The TTMRA: 
•  increases opportunities for New Zealanders and Australians to work in each 
other’s country; 
•  encourages greater cooperation between registration authorities in Australia 
and New Zealand; 
•  provides an impetus for both countries to consider the appropriateness of 
existing regulatory requirements; and 
•  provides greater discipline on regulators contemplating new registration 
requirements. 
 
Although the TTMRA has been in place for close to three years, we are not aware of 
any formal work evaluating the effects of this Act.  However, information to date 
suggests that the registrations of professions are coordinated more closely across the 
Tasman.  For example, since the TTMRA was signed, 72 Australian domiciled patent 
attorneys have registered to practise in NZ, bringing the total number of patent 
attorneys registered to practise in NZ to 210.  In other words, the TTMRA has lead to a 
50% increase in the size of the NZ patent attorney industry.  Meanwhile, some 56 NZ 
domiciled patent attorneys have registered in Australia
xix.  It is fair to say that in this 
industry, the TTMRA has resulted in a significant level of integration, at least from a NZ 
perspective. 
 
In looking at policy issues, we have seen how integration has helped open up options 
for better policy design, but how tensions have arisen Trans-Tasman as a result of the 
continuing imbalance in migration.  They have been resolved in the case of welfare 
payments by redesigning the underlying policies.  In the case of migration from third 
countries small differences in criteria have been lived with so far. 
 
 18 
What of the Future? 
 
We have seen the tensions that have arisen in the past.  They would probably have 
been minor if migration had been in balance.  Whether these tensions continue, and 
intensify in the future, may well depend on New Zealand’s economic growth. 
 
One can see two competing forces.  On the one hand, we have the prospect of 
continuing reductions in the cost of information, transport and communications.  For 
example, the cost of a trans-Tasman fare has dropped from 3 weeks of work at the 
average wage in 1950 to 1 week in 1985 (Brosnan and Poot, 1987a).   
Telecommunication costs have dropped even more significantly.  People might be able 
to do business more easily from a distance.  If so, then there would be more tele-
working, the growth of smaller centres, and the growth of economic activity in places 
far flung from much of the population such as New Zealand.  Our successful designers 
– from software to fashion to furniture – show that it’s possible. 
 
On the other hand, activity and people may concentrate increasingly in fewer, denser 
places.  Recent economic research suggests that productivity and wages are higher in 
big cities, wages grow faster, there is more innovation and more opportunities for 
specialization and its attendant efficiency gains. 
 
Higher population density leads to greater exchange of information, labour market 
advantages such as improved matching and greater security for workers because of 
the pool of employment opportunities.  These factors may be more important over time 
as economies of scale increase and tacit information exchange becomes more 
important. 
 
To see the implications for New Zealand, consider the following figure. 
 
Figure 7: Common Radius From Wellington and Helsinki 
 
 
It shows a 2,200 kilometres radius from Wellington which encompasses about 3.8 
million people, with the same radius from Helsinki covering over 300 million, from 39 
countries.  We have chosen Helsinki as a comparator to Wellington because Finland is 19 
another small country, whose economic performance is sometimes compared with that 
of New Zealand.  If population density matters for growth then being in the middle of 
miles of ocean isn’t a promising place to start. 
 
We do not know which scenario will result and it is largely out of the control of 
governments anyway.  Their choice is whether or not to pursue policies that result in 





In conclusion, we have seen how many New Zealanders have followed Horace Greeley 
and gone West (even if rather further West than he intended).  This is not, however, 
evidence that a common labour market leads to a “brain drain”.  Higher-skilled workers 
in selected occupations would presumably have access to the Australian labour market 
even without the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement.  The key effect of economic 
integration has been to increase the flows of those who would otherwise have been 
excluded.  These include the lower-skilled and the higher-skilled older workers or those 
whose occupations were not in the approved occupational list. 
 
In turn, departing NZ citizens are being replaced by a slightly larger inflow of 
immigrants who, on paper, appear slightly higher skilled although in practice this may 
not be the case. 
 
The marked imbalance in migration between the two countries has led to tensions in 
relation to the fiscal implications of welfare payments and increased interest in ensuring 
common criteria for migrants from third countries.  These bilateral tensions probably 
precipitated issues that would have to be faced eventually in a world with greater 
mobility over a working life. 20 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                
i This section on migration trends draws heavily from Glass (2001).  Other references that also provide a 
detailed discussion of these trends include Bedford (1999) and Lidgard and Bedford (1999).  Unless 
otherwise stated, the data used to derive the tables and to plot the figures in this paper are obtained from 
unpublished arrival/departure data provided by the Customer Services Division of Statistics New Zealand. 
ii The figure for New Zealand was obtained from Part 1: Population Change and Structure in Demographic 
Trends 1999 (Statistics New Zealand) while the Australian figure was sourced from Chapter 1: Population 
Growth and International Movement in Population Flows: Immigration Aspects 2000 Edition (Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs). 
iii People coming to and going from New Zealand are required to fill in a card. The arrival card records how 
long residents have been away from New Zealand or and how long non-residents intend to stay.   
Departure cards record how long residents intend to be away or how long non-residents have stayed.  
Those who respond with intentions greater than one year are called long term and permanent migrants; 
others are short-term visitors.  The permanent and long-term data used for Figure 1 has been adjusted to 
include those whose behaviour is different from their stated intentions, such as a resident who intended to 
stay away less than a year but actually was away longer.  It is noted that the trends obtained from these 
adjusted figures are broadly similar to those from the PLT data, although there is more volatility from year 
to year according to the former.  These adjusted figures suggest the “drain” is significantly more negative 
in the year to 2000 than the PLT figures, but they also suggest that in 1999, there was a net gain (in 
contrast to the PLT data).  This point has also been echoed by Bedford (2001). 
iv This trend is also observed when we look at the trans-Tasman flows.  The growing importance of 
migration as a labour market adjustment mechanism is probably true across other countries as well, which 
is not surprising since geographic mobility is much less costly now worldwide. 
v The Immigration Service reports limited data on the skills of non-New Zealand immigrants, and the only 
source of information on the skills of New Zealand returnees and those departing the country is the 
question on the departure and arrival cards that asks for travellers’ occupations. 
vi The classification Glass (2001) used is the same as that in Shevland (1999), who used the terms: 
Symbolic Analyst, In-person services, and Routine Production, in preference to high-skilled, semi-skilled 
and low-skilled.  However, as noted in Glass (2001) and Humphris (2001), the use of the terms high-, 
semi- and low-skilled is not exact.  The terms are used here for simplicity, rather than for precision. 
vii Since the proportion of travellers who do not specify an occupation or are “not actively engaged” is large 
(and growing), and we cannot tell the skill distribution of these people, the overall breakdowns and 
conclusions drawn here should be treated with quite some caution.  Our working assumption is that 
people’ propensity to not fill in the form or to be “not actively engaged” does not vary across skill levels. 
viii It is important to keep in mind that this data is only for permanent and long term migrants.  Short term 
flows and those who change their intentions are very important for source and destination country analysis 
(Lidgard and Bedford, 1999). 
ix These are preliminary estimates from Statistics New Zealand, obtained through personal communication. 
x For this figure, we have not had the opportunity to consider PLT migration figures adjusted for category 
jumpers. 
xi Pre-1979 data for this figure were sourced from Pool (1980, p. 29). 
xii For a discussion of the significance of returning New Zealanders, see Lidgard (1993, 1994). 
xiii It should be noted that the BERL (1999) estimates do not include the impact of temporary flows of 
workers on the stock of human capital or on the labour force.  There are more work permits (for up to three 
years) issued each year than residence permits, so the impact might be reasonably significant. 
xiv The economic determinants of Trans-Tasman migration have been examined in, inter alia, Brosnan and 
Poot (1987a), Poot (1993, 1995), Nana and Poot (1996), as well as Gorbey, James and Poot (1999). 
xv The labour force data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) are only available by birthplace, not 
citizenship. Consequently, we cannot really compare the unemployment rates and labour force 
participation rates for NZ-born and non-NZ born citizens from New Zealand. 
xvi These payments were originally calculated on a complex formula reflecting relative benefit levels and 
the proportion of working life that each individual covered by the agreement spent in New Zealand and 
Australia respectively.  For further details, contact the Department of Social Security, for a copy of the 
“Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on Social 
Security”, which was signed on 7 September 1995.  More recently, New Zealand and Australia negotiated 
an interim agreement with the yearly amounts agreed in advance, giving more certainty about New 
Zealand's liability to Australia and avoiding the need for such detailed calculations. 
xvii This imbalance is addressed in the new social security agreement.  The Australian government will pay 
age pensions for future New Zealand migrants who work in Australia then retire in New Zealand, based on 
their working life residence in Australia, and vice versa. 
xviii For more details on the recent changes to the social security arrangements announced on 26 February 
2001, see the following pdf file http://www.immi.gov.au/general/newzeal_0201.pdf or visit the website 
http://www.nz-oz.gov.au/ 
xix These figures were provided by Peter Mumford from the New Zealand Ministry of Economic 
Development. 